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Abstract. Social Network Services (SNS) business models highly depend on the 
gathering and analyzation of user data to obtain an advantage in competition for 
advertising clients. Nevertheless, an extensive collection and analysis of this data 
poses a threat to users’ privacy. Based on an economic perspective it seems 
rational for Social Network Operators (SNO) to ignore the users’ desire for 
privacy. However, privacy-friendly services might have the potential to earn 
users’ trust, leading to an increased revelation of personal data. Addressing these 
issues, we examine the existing privacy problem in SNS in the context of 
competition between SNO to investigate whether competition tend to enhance 
user privacy or whether it is the root of its violation. Therefore, this paper 
investigates the interconnectedness of the market structure and privacy problems 
in SNS. After analyzing the users’ and the advertisers’ side of SNS, their 
competitiveness and its influence on user privacy are examined. 
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1 Introduction 
At least since Facebook was published in 2004, social network services (SNS) have 
constantly been on the rise and consume evermore of our daily online time and, thereby, 
of our personal data. Moreover, since the beginning of the smartphone age SNS have 
even been following us from our desktops to every place we go. They demand us to 
share every bit of our lives with our friends within the network and, thus, with the 
network itself. Consequently, Harvard Law professor Jonathan Zittrain deduced in 2008 
that this technology threatens “to push everyone towards treating each public encounter 
as if it were a press conference” [1]. This thirst for user data can be explained with the 
business model of SNS which heavily depends on gathering and analyzing user data to 
deliver targeted advertisements [2]. This extensive collection and analysis of user data 
poses a severe threat to users’ privacy. Hence, Margo Seltzer, professor in computer 
systems at Harvard University, sets it straight at the Davos Forum in 2015 stating that 
“privacy as we knew it in the past is no longer feasible” [3]. 
Disclosed data itself is necessary for SNS businesses to improve their targeting of 
advertisements and thereby obtain an advantage in competition for business customers, 
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which demand for precisely targeted advertising. Hence, users’ demand for privacy-
friendliness only becomes important insofar as it is helps providers to gain trust and to 
get users to reveal even more personal data [4]. Thus, it seems not an irrational 
ignorance of users’ desire for privacy by the providers but a rational choice in an 
economic competition not to prioritize this desire. 
The paper takes an economic perspective on the present privacy problem in SNS to 
investigate whether competition between providers tends to enhance user privacy or 
whether it is the root of its violation. For this purpose we investigate privacy in those 
business focusing on the market structure, thereby taking into account that SNS 
constitute multi-sided platforms (MSP) [5]. Analyzing the users’ and the advertisers’ 
side of SNS, we compare their competitiveness and its influence on user privacy. 
Therefore, we build upon insights from theoretical literature concerning MSP, 
behavioral research papers about SNS and privacy, as well as market evidence. 
In the following we will first state the essential definitions for our investigation in 
section 1.1 and further give a brief overview of the related literature in section 2. 
Thereafter, we start with the analysis of the influence of SNS competition on user 
privacy, firstly by examining the characteristics of the goods which are up for rivalry 
on the different market sides in the SNS environment, and secondly, by investigating 
those goods and competitions in detail considering appropriate findings from scientific 
literature (see section 3.1). Thirdly, we will analyze their impact on user privacy in 
section 3.2 and following. Finally, we will discuss our results, match them with 
empirical evidence (see section 4) and give a summary of our paper in the conclusion. 
1.1 Essential Definitions 
As mentioned above, we aim at investigating the interrelation of the market structure 
in social networks services (SNS) and user privacy. Hence, there is a need to clarify the 
term and interpretation of SNS. According to the updated definition of Kane et al. [6], 
which builds upon the earlier characterization of Ellison [7], SNS contain the following 
features: “users (1) have a unique user profile that is constructed by the users, by 
members of their network, and by the platform; (2) access digital content through, and 
protect it from, various search mechanisms provided by the platform; (3) can articulate 
a list of other users with whom they share a relational connection; and (4) view and 
traverse their connections and those made by others on the platform” [6]. In the 
following we use this definition as a basis to describe and understand SNS. However, 
we add the restraint that the main revenue source of the SNS should be advertising to 
ensure the multi-sided platform character of our investigation object. Hence, the scope 
of our analysis contains SNS such as Facebook, Google+ and Twitter. 
Moreover, we define the term of Social Network Operators (SNO) as companies, 
which "provide the underlying basic services and infrastructures, needed by users to 
interact with each other" [8]. In the case of Facebook, the website facebook.com 
constitutes the SNS while the company Facebook Inc. is the SNO. 
Further, the term multi-sided platform, also known as two-sided platform or market, 
requires a clear definition, too. Therefore, we draw on the work of Staykova and 
Damsgaard [5]. According to their research, MSP (1) enable direct interaction between 
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two or more participants affiliated to them; (2) are containing homing and switching 
costs for those participants; and (3) include direct and indirect network effects [5] (see 
Fig. 1). In our setting, homing costs are the costs in money, effort, time and other 
aspects of entering and using an MSP. Moreover, switching costs are similar onetime 
costs that occur if participants switch from one platform to another. Additionally, 
network effects occur when the value of the platform or its product for one participant 
is influenced by the total number of participants (of the same or another side). Those 
effects can be both positive or negative and are seen as a key aspect of MSP [9]. 
 
Figure 1. MSP model, including platform participants (I&II), same-side network effects (1&4), 
and cross-side network effects (2&3) [5]. 
The privacy definition used in this paper builds upon Westin's definition of privacy. 
Hereby, he defines it as "the claim of individuals, groups or institutions to determine 
for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated 
to others” [10]. For him, “this, also, involves when such information will be obtained 
and what uses will be made of it by others” [11]. In the context of SNS, we consider 
privacy as the capability of SNS users to control their personal data and its collection, 
aggregation, analysis and possible transfer by the SNO and third parties, as well as 
users' ability to optimize the amount of data disclosure and its security against misuse 
with respect to their preferences. 
The legal definition for personal data is provided by the EU data protection directive 
as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person”.1 However, 
for our case a broader classification is useful. Drawing from Nolte, we define personal 
data as “any data revealed by user action, starting from simple likes, to direct personal 
information, and even analysis of users click and browse behavior” [12]. This 
diversification is necessary to capture that by the aggregation and combination of meta- 
and behavioral data, inferences can be drawn. Those can constitute sensitive 
information for users and sometimes even personal data in the definition of European 
data protection law [13]. Given this definition, it is obvious that the data-centric 
business model described above constitutes a severe threat to users' privacy. 
                                                          
1 EU Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC), 1995. 
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2 Related Literature 
User privacy in SNS is a widely examined and discussed issue. Basically, the topic can 
be divided into two main research streams: Behavioral and user-focused research as 
well as provider-focused research. The former offers the seemingly contradictive result 
that users on the one hand care for privacy and try to preserve it with privacy-seeking 
behavior [14], but on the other hand do not act privacy-aware and seemingly carelessly 
disclose personal data when using Internet services [15]. Those findings led to the 
definition of the so-called “privacy paradox” [16]. Furthermore, provider-focused 
research has shown that privacy is not a major market factor in the competition for user 
attraction although users estimate it of high importance for them [17, 18]. 
However, the question wherefrom this dynamism arises which drives SNS providers 
to claim more and more user data and thereby restrict user privacy is still open to 
research. Different forces interact which each other and the participants in an SNS. 
Most of those forces have direct or indirect influences on privacy [19]. One popular 
assumption is that users’ demand for privacy is of minor priority for SNS providers 
because users are not willing to pay for it [20] and the monetary income is generated 
by advertisement customers [2]. However, recent successful mail services show that a 
minority of users is willing to spend small monetary amounts for increased 
communication privacy.2 Other companies in the Internet search business even display 
the possibility to succeed without demanding any money for a privacy respecting 
service [21]. Nevertheless, this willingness to pay for privacy either in a monetary way 
or in terms of switching costs seems of no significance for SNS [15, 22, 23]. 
Further, the more general question of competition in MSP has been addressed from 
different angles. The economics of two-sided markets have most notably been explored 
by Rochet and Tirole [24]. Further research into MSP market structures has been 
conducted by Armstrong [25], Evans and Schmalensee [26] and others [5, 27]. While 
these highly recognized works provide deep insights into the economics of MSP, they 
do not cover privacy issues. A variety of publications address the questions of 
competition and monopolistic tendencies in online MSP, while focusing on the search 
engine market and Google’s market position in particular [28, 29] or on SNS and 
Internet services in general [30]. However, the potential interrelation of the privacy 
problems in SNS and the market structure are not in the focus of current research. 
3 Economic Analysis 
In the following section we introduce and clarify the MSP business of SNS. Further, 
the traded goods in an SNS environment are examined from different angles to 
determine their competitive character. Afterwards, we consider their influences on user 
privacy for both sides of the SNS/MSP entity, namely the users’ and the advertisers’ 
side. For simplicity other SNS participants, like application developers, are bypassed. 
                                                          
2 Mailbox.org, Posteo.de and others. 
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As argued above, SNS in general constitute an MSP, generating revenue by 
brokerage of targeted advertising to its users for business partners [2, 31, 32]. A closer 
view on the market structure reveals strong direct same-side network effects between 
its users, because each additional user makes the SNS more attractive to others [33, 34]. 
Moreover, there are indirect cross-side network effects between users and advertisers. 
Each additional user makes the network more valuable for advertising clients. This is 
due, firstly, to a broader audience for targeted advertisement and, secondly, to a higher 
amount of user data, which elicits the possibility of drawing inferences and thereby 
creates more precise profiles [5]. On the other side, users are at least accepting 
personalized advertisements as a price to use SNS free of monetary charge [32]. 
However, there are no positive network effects between the advertisers, rather the 
opposite can be assumed. While advertisers profit from additional SNS users and often 
perform side-advertisement by promoting their SNS company profiles (e.g. advertising 
the company’s Facebook-page or Twitter-account), they are rivals to other advertisers 
within the same network for the limited space of targeted advertisements (see Fig. 2). 
3.1 Features of Social Network Service Goods 
As already stated, advertising companies are in rivalry for the limited space for targeted 
advertisements. More precisely, currently leading SNS auction targeted advertisement 
for specific audiences or keywords in a real-time bidding system between interested 
advertisers. The space for advertisement in the network is limited and advertising 
clients can exclude each other through a higher bid for the same keyword or target 
group, thus, the good of advertisement is exclusive and a rival good. Furthermore, a 
SNO can decide to exclude some advertisers from its service. Hence, advertisement in 
SNS is a classic private good (see Table 1). Thus, one has to assume that there exists a 
strong rivalry between similar advertisers. Classifying this insights into a feature of 
goods table shows that the service of providing targeted advertisement within SNS is 
to be considered a private good [35]. 
Categorizing the SNS users-side is more complicated. First of all, we have to 
distinguish between two different goods: the plain SNS membership and the actual 
usage of the network. The first requires usually only a valid email address and roughly 
two minutes for filling out the application form and confirming one’s mail address. The 
second comprises the aforementioned homing costs, time and effort to understand the 
SNS’ practice as well as adding user created content. Both add up to the aforementioned 
switching costs (c.f. section 1.1). We already argued that users experience same-side 
network effects from other users. Hence, profile creating and SNS usage is non-rival. 
Creating a profile and actively participating in an SNS prevents no one else from joining 
or using it.3 In addition, the question to be answered is whether those user-sided goods 
are excludable or not which makes the difference between a public good and a club 
good. At first glance, it seems intuitively to argue that those goods are public because 
no one seems to be able to exclude someone else from the usage. However, people from 
Turkey trying to access Facebook during the military coup in July 2016 or generally 
                                                          
3 Except for server overload which is not discussed here for simplicity. 
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trying to use it in China or North Korea will disagree. Countries as well as SNO have 
technical instruments to restrict SNS access or directly ban specific users.4 Hence, the 
SNS registration and usage is non-rival but excludable for users’ side whereby it 
complies with the characteristics of a club good (see Table 1). 
Table 1. Feature of Goods Classification for SNS 
 excludable non-excludable 




non-rival “club good” 
SNS registration & usage 
“public good” 
3.2 The Social Network Operator Viewpoint 
The last angle missing is the SNO perspective. First, the providers compete among 
themselves for advertising clients. All SNS are offering roughly the same product on 
this market side: targeted advertisement. It applies here that neither can money spent 
by an advertiser in one network be spent twice, nor can advertisement space be assigned 
multiple times. Accordingly, one can assume that the SNS advertisement market side 
is in strong competition because several providers supply a comparable private good to 
a high quantity of advertisement-willing companies (see Fig. 2). 
Second, user registration and membership seems non-rival from an SNO perspective 
because users can easily set up multiple accounts in different SNS. Moreover, a 
provider is not able to prohibit its members from registering at other networks nor to 
hinder other services to open their registration for them. Yet, users can decide to refuse 
a certain SNS. However, competition undoubtedly exists for attracting users between 
SNO, since the quantity of accounts is a signal to attract advertisers. 
Third and most interesting from an SNO perspective is the time users spend in the 
network. It seems to be a highly valuable good for providers, because it increases the 
possible quantity of advertisements shown to users and probably the amount of data 
disclosed by them [14]. Further, users’ time and attention is limited and can only be 
spent once to an SNS. A strong competition for users’ time between SNS and also other 
services can thus be presumed [36]. As a result, users are not only paying for an SNS 
with revealed personal data but also with their time and attention (see Fig. 2). 
                                                          
4 Technical workarounds for users are neglectable for our analysis. 
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Figure 2. The market structure of SNS 
3.3 Competition on Users’ Side 
Analyzing the SNS’ competition on the users’ side of the market structure, we firstly 
identified two relevant factors: trust and enjoyment [33, 34]. On the one side, as 
described before, the SNO wants to receive users’ time and therewith their attention for 
advertisements and their disclosed personal data for improved targeting of those 
advertisements [37]. On the other side, users want to enjoy an SNS and demand it 
trustworthy [4, 33, 34], while enjoyment also includes strong same-side network 
effects, i.e. finding the own friends within the same SNS [34]. 
Targeting the trust factor first, literature shows that increasing trust in their SNS can 
be achieved for SNO by implementing privacy controls [33, 38]. This is not only 
relevant because improved trust increases the SNS usage but also the quantity of 
disclosed data and the acceptance of advertising [39, 40]. Hence, trustworthiness is 
beneficial for SNS to bind users to the service as well as to receive more user-generated 
content and reliable user data. Undoubtedly the implementation of privacy controls has 
a positive influence on user privacy in SNS [19]. However, findings suggest a design 
conflict between privacy and usability and, thus, enjoyment [18]. 
Talking about the enjoyment of an SNS, it seems to be the most crucial factor in 
SNO competition. Firstly, because it attracts users to join a network and, thus, self-
evidently increases positive same-side network effects between the users as well as 
positive cross-side network effects from the users’ side to the advertisers’. Secondly, 
enjoyment tempts users to spend more time with the network, leading again to positive 
influence on advertisers. Additionally, more time spent in an SNS also increases the 
quantity of user-generated content because content creators value a platform more if 
they have a larger audience [41]. Further, a higher amount of content again attracts 
more advertisers because it enhances the providers’ targeting ability for advertisement. 
To conclude, we find plenty of motives for providers to compete with enjoyment for 
user registrations and user time. SNO are facing this competition by increasing their 
own platform stickiness. Literature results show that there exist mainly two ways of 
doing so which add to another: increasing the content of the platform and implementing 
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more features and functionalities to it [5, 36]. While the latter seems at first glance 
privacy neutral for users, changing the platform appearance to entice users to enter more 
data clearly is a threat to their privacy [14]. However, additional platform features also 
contain the potential to harm user privacy when they educe additional personal data 
from users or even leak those data from the platform to third parties if the SNO decides 
to open her network to external application developers. 
3.4 Competition on Advertisers’ Side 
As already stated, SNO compete for selling targeted advertising to corresponding 
customers (c.f. section 3.2). To attract those advertisers, we identified four factors as 
most relevant: the quantity of users, the accuracy in user targeting to serve the 
advertisements, the time users spend in the network and the price to advertise to the 
targeted user group. In their evolution, the majority of SNS followed the same path: 
first starting one-sided and attracting users, and after hitting a critical mass, 
implementing advertisement and thereby evolving into a two-sided platform [5]. Later, 
most SNS also included external application developers and other services (e.g. identity 
management) and, thus, transformed into an MSP. However, we already covered the 
privacy impacts of competition for user registration in the previous section. 
Besides the pure quantity of users, the average time a user spends in the network 
appears to be the crucial factor in the competition for advertisers [36]. Its theoretical 
competition and privacy impacts on users’ side were already shown above. However, 
another option for tying users closer and longer to a network seems to enhance the SNS 
content [6, 42]. This can either happen by tempting users to post more data or by 
including external content creators and their content directly into the network (e.g. news 
sites or celebrities). A further method is simply to acquire competitors and include their 
services into the own SNS. We already showed the possible privacy threats of tempting 
users to reveal more data above. The method of including further content form external 
content creators is basically privacy neutral, except for users’ active reaction on this 
content (e.g. likes and comments). However, implementing bought-up competitors and 
especially merging their existing user data and accounts with already existing in-
network user data can be extremely privacy invasive. Merging that data and drawing 
inferences from the new database can reveal information which the user initially wanted 
to hide by audience-segmentation via using two separated services. 
The third identified factor is the accuracy of user targeting. The most obvious way 
of improving this factor is to gather more user data, either directly from the users or 
from external sources, to analyze it with algorithms. The impacts of user data have 
already been discussed. However, one has to expect that the possibilities of enhancing 
targeting by user data somewhere hits a limit value where gathering more data does not 
result in any more improvements. Hence, another method to improve the targeting 
constitutes a direct inquiry of users either for their interest or indirectly by giving them 
the controls to correct their information and drawn inferences connected to their 
account [37]. The latter can be privacy enhancing for users if it is allowed for them to 
delete data or at least exclude certain information from the targeting mechanisms. 
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Finally, the cost-benefit-factor of advertising in an SNS depicts a crucial aspect, 
since the advertisement side is the monetary paying side. As every agent acting in an 
economic environment, advertisers seek for the most efficient way to spend their money 
and, thus, to target their audience. Besides the developers’ achievement of a leading 
targeting algorithm and the already treated topic of feeding it with user data, SNO have 
another factor to influence the efficiency of their advertisement offer: economics of 
scale. Additionally to non-rivalry and excludability, user membership and activity in 
SNS have the characteristic of low marginal costs. The costs to provide the service to 
an additional user are, after establishing a working system, marginal for the SNO. The 
same holds true for the advertisers’ side and the service of automated advertising space 
auctions. Hence, this leads to rising returns of scale which makes an SNS the more 
efficient the larger both sides are. Thus, the direct way to increase SNS attractiveness 
for advertisers is to gain more users joining and spending time in the SNS. This 
becomes even more efficient if those users originate from different target groups, 
because the SNS then represents all sections of society. This insight leads us directly 
back to section 3.3 and the discussed influences on privacy and competition. 
3.5 The Trump Side of Competition 
In the previous sections, we analyzed the two major sides of SNS regarding competition 
and their impacts on user privacy. Table 2 summarizes the different activities of SNO 
and their influences. However, it seems uncertain which side in competition outweighs 
the other and, thus, whose needs are favored by the SNO for economic reasons. If the 
users’ side and therewith users’ needs are preferred it is to be expected that the trust 
factor could lead to an improvement of users’ data control options and, thus, to an 
enhanced user privacy. We expect the opposite if advertisers are the SNO-favored SNS 
side, due to the demand of evermore user data for better profiling. 
Table 2. SNO activities and their influence on user privacy 
SNO Activity Influence on User Privacy 
Implementing Privacy Controls + 
Give Users Control to Correct and Enhance the Information 
and Drawn Inferences Connected to their Account  
+ 
Implement more Features and Functionalities ❍ 
Changing Platform Design to Entice User to Enter More Data - 
Merging their Existing User Data and Accounts with Already 
Existing In-Network User Data  - 
 
Following the influential papers on MSP, the standard link from classical economics 
between the inverse relation of price over marginal cost and elasticity of demand does 
not hold true for MSP. In other words, the service on one side will be served by the 
provider even if this service and the price paid for it by the its participant alone is not 
profitable [26]. Hence, the loss from one side has to be outweighed by the profits from 
the other. To identify the provider’s cash cow we have to find out on which side 
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multihoming is most prevalent [24, 25]. In other words, the side where the MSP 
participants use more than one platform simultaneously is expected to be overpriced, 
while the singlehoming side is expected to be subsidized [43]. 
4 Discussion 
In this section we will match the theoretical analysis of competition and its influence 
on privacy in SNS with available market observations and empirical evidence. 
Subsequently, we discuss whether this evidence confirms our theoretical findings. 
First, targeting the mentioned trust factor of section 3.3 we find that current 
developments indicate that SNS and other Internet services recognized the coherency 
between users’ trust and user-generated content. Respectively, Facebook introduced 
new privacy controls in 2008 [44] and constantly improves them [45] while Google 
implemented its own user privacy controls lauded by specialized press [46]. However, 
another reason for this privacy trend in Internet services might be the upcoming reform 
of the EU Data Protection Directive which comes with rigid laws and harmful financial 
penalties in case of violations [47]. Hence, the future of this trend is sustainably 
influenced not only by user behavior but also by the corresponding law. Utterances of 
the European Commissioner let us assume that the end of the road of regulating Internet 
services concerning competition and user privacy hast not been yet reached [48]. 
As showed in sections 3.3 and 3.4, SNO compete against each other for users’ time 
spent on their platform as well as for content. Therefore, they implement new features 
into their platforms or integrate taken-over services and external apps. Recent 
developments in Internet services and SNS make this competition visible. The 
acquisition of WhatsApp by Facebook, as well as the takeover of Instagram led to a 
domination of Facebook in the branches of mobile messaging and mobile photo 
sharing. Moreover, Facebook started partly merging Facebook and Instagram accounts 
and announced in the latest terms and conditions change of WhatsApp that phone 
numbers and contacts will be transferred to Facebook [49]. Both clearly contain the 
aforementioned privacy threats of merging different services accounts. 
As a result, Facebook’s recent introduction of instant articles can not only be 
interpreted as an attempt to enlarge the own content but also as an attack on Google and 
Twitter [50]. Furthermore, Facebook included the feature of selling tickets for events 
and recently announced the possibility to run crowd-funding campaigns and collect 
money directly inside the SNS [51]. This seems to be an attempt to use its already large 
user base and the resulting network-effects to include the markets for online ticket-sale 
and crowd-funding and, thereby, keep the users as long as possible in the Facebook 
environment. The same applies to implementation of an own browser within the 
Facebook app, a strategy also used by Twitter. 
Moreover, companies like Google, Facebook and Twitter provide identity 
management features which enable users to log-in with their already existing SNS 
accounts to external services. What seems like a comfortable feature to make users’ life 
of managing different online accounts easier, can also be interpreted as a way to gather 
more data from external services, track users beyond the own platform and enhance 
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both targeting and time for displaying advertisement. We already pointed out the 
privacy threat aspects of those strategies. 
However, the most interesting question is which side, the users’ or the advertisers’, 
is subsidized and who is the “cash cow” (see section 3.5). Evidence from the magazine 
industry suggest that users are subsidized and advertisers are the main income source 
[52, 53]. The fact that users are not paying any monetary price for SNS and advertising 
is the main income source for SNO strongly supports this view [54]. Nevertheless, 
considering multihoming as the crucial factor, recent statistics suggest that it is on the 
rise on users’ side with 52% of US users using two or more social media sites in 2014 
[55]. However, the relevant factor of SNS competition on users’ side is also the time 
spent in the network (see section 3.2). Facebook leads by far with 70% of its users using 
the platform daily before Instagram with 49% and Twitter with 36%, while the second 
also belongs to the Facebook environment. Moreover, “the engagement of Facebook 
users continues to grow, while daily use on other platforms shows little change” [55]. 
 Because, we lack numbers for multihoming behavior on the advertisers’ side we use 
the market distribution as an indicator. In 2014 Alphabets’ share of the net digital 
advertising revenue was 31%. This revenue includes the income from targeted 
advertising on the Google search sites and also the advertisement revenue from services 
like YouTube, Google+ and AdWords. The leader is followed by Facebook with a 
market share of nearly 8% and the Chinese online search engine Baidu with close to 
5% [56]. Despite these distinct numbers the development of the online advertisement 
market indicates that the competition between the targeted advertisement-offering SNO 
is rising. While Alphabet was able to keep its market share over the last three years, 
competitors are catching up. Facebook nearly doubled its market share from 2012 to 
2014 from 4% to close to 8%. Besides, except for two, all other market participants 
beyond the 0,5% market share were able to claim slightly more percentages each year 
[56]. This development indicates not only that online targeted advertisement is 
becoming more popular but also let us presume that adverting clients tend to use more 
than one Internet services and, thus, show multihoming behavior.  
The point that both sides of SNS seem to show multihoming behavior and that the 
users’ side does not pay for their usage in terms of money makes it difficult to apply 
the insights of MSP markets and multihoming here. As mentioned afore, on the one 
hand one could claim that users are the subsidized side because they are enjoying SNS 
for free. However, on the other hand one could also argue that advertisers are being 
favored and thus subsidized because they are the crucial revenue source of SNO. 
Moreover, advertisement prices in SNS seem comparably low to those paid in print 
media and we expect the targeting to be more exact due to the revealed user data [54]. 
Hence, advertisers could be subsidized with better targeting for comparably lower 
prices while users could be overpriced in terms of private data elicit by the SNS and, 
thus, lower privacy. However, according to the lack of literature and data available we 
are not able to finally assess this case. 
In summary, our investigation shows that competition between SNO does neither 
necessarily improve user privacy nor does it generally harm it. Competition in MSP 
like SNS is complex and our analysis shows that there are indeed various privacy 
harmful aspects. However, the competition for users could have privacy friendly 
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consequences, if the trust factor outweighs the privacy contrary implementation of 
additional features and overtaken services. 
4.1 Limitations & Future Research 
Our work is limited due to the available data about certain market aspects of SNS 
competitions. We found no data about multihoming behavior of advertisers regarding 
the purchase of targeted advertising in SNS. Additionally, there is no evidence whether 
newly integrated privacy controls by Facebook and Google are actively used and, thus, 
increase user privacy or if they are just having a trust-building and thereby possible 
privacy harming effect. Moreover, the comparably low costs of targeted advertisement 
in SNS can partly be explained by the strong economics of scale and the near-zero 
variable cost of running an SNS and displaying advertisement compared to print media. 
Hence, future research in this area should tackle and close this data gap. 
Furthermore, considering our classification of SNS goods, club goods as the SNS 
membership and usage from user side also have the characteristic of low marginal costs. 
This leads to rising returns of scale, which makes club goods ideal for natural 
monopolies [35]. Considering the costs to set up an SNS by programming the service 
and establishing the computing power to serve a broad user base as well as the high 
costs of running such a server infrastructure as fixed costs, there exist monopoly 
tendencies for this market [57]. Future research could build upon our work to 
investigate those tendencies and their influence on privacy for the SNS market. 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper we investigated the challenge of user privacy in SNS from an economic 
perspective. The aim was to analyze if competition between networks tends to decrease 
or enhance user privacy. Therefore, we first clarified that SNS are multi-sided platforms 
with at least two sides: users on the one and advertising clients on the other side. 
Furthermore, we characterized the traded goods within SNS markets from the three 
viewpoints of users, advertisers and social network operators showing that SNS 
membership and usage are club goods from user perspective, while targeted 
advertisement is a private good from an advertiser and SNO viewpoint. 
Moreover, SNO compete for advertisers on the one side. On the other side they 
compete for users’ membership and more intensely for users’ time. In order to attract 
the advertisers, providers have to maximize their targeting for advertisements and the 
time users spend within their platform. Hence, they have the incentive to gather as much 
personal data from users as possible and enhance their platform with additional content, 
features and services to bind users’ attention and spend time in the SNS. All analyzed 
factors of competition in the SNS environment contain unilateral privacy threatening 
aspects. Except for the factor of user trust for an SNS, gained by implementing privacy 
controls as one aspect to get users to reveal more data. Furthermore, the fact that users 
do not pay in monetary terms for SNS usage but that advertising clients are the crucial 
revenue source for SNO suggests that users might be discriminated against and 
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overpriced in terms of personal data disclosure. However, the validation by the MSP 
theory where the multihoming side is overpriced and the singlehoming side is 
subsidized provides no sufficient results to verify or reject this assumption. In summary, 
this analysis shows that competition in the SNS environment does neither generally 
harm user privacy nor does it necessarily improve it. However, the latter seems less 
likely, unless the competition for users’ trust outweighs all the other privacy divergent 
aspects. The case of competition in the Internet MSP is complex and current statistics 
provide not enough data to give a solid answer to the question whether advertisers or 
users are subsidized by the SNO. Nevertheless, the analysis of our research question 
shows that competition can be assumed to have a negative influence on user privacy at 
the present stage. 
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